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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/03/2004 Accident number: 33 
Accident time: 09:13 Accident Date: 17/11/1995 
Where it occurred: Homoine, Inhambane 
Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 27/11/1995 
ID original source: ADP-6/ MC/TL Name of source: CND/IND/ADP 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: metal fragments 
 
Date record created: 22/01/2004 Date  last modified: 22/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 




An internal investigation of the accident was carried out by Technical Advisors with the 
demining group and made available. The following summarises its content.  
The demining platoon had "cleared 5,1602 metres and eight mines at Homoine before the 
accident". The mines were laid in a narrow belt but not in a pattern. The mines found before 
were PMN, PMN-2, PMD6 and POMZ2M. The victim was in a crouching position with his arm 
outstretched (holding a trowel) when he initiated a PMN with his right foot.  He was not using 
his detector (which was 12 metres away). He was taken to hospital at 09:35 and arrived at 
10:05. A blood shortage meant that other deminers had to donate three litres of blood. 
The victim's boots, photographed by the researcher in 1995, are shown here. 
 
 
The investigators stated that the detector (a Schiebel AN-19) was "working properly and was 
capable of detecting a PMN at over 30cm depth". They found two fragments in the area 
cleared by the victim. The striker and plunger spring of the PMN were discovered at the seat 
of the explosion. The crater was 27cm deep – which the investigators took to indicate that the 
mine was probably 5-10cm deep.   
 
Recommendations 
The investigators said that the use of both detectors and excavation should be phased out 
where detectors could be used alone, and that deminers should get more training on using 
detectors in contaminated soil. They further recommended that another detector that could be 
used kneeling should be investigated. That deminers should be fined if they leave metal in 
"cleared" areas, that the hospital should be warned to expect a casualty and deminers' blood 
groups should be on their ID cards. They added that, at Inhambane hospital, medics should 
stay with the patient to ensure he gets good care and food.  
 
One investigator made a supplementary accident report regarding the victim's sobriety on 
12th December 1995 after talking to the surgeon who did not suspect alcoholic influence. 
Also, the victim's friends said he was not drinking the night before. The investigation into 
sobriety went no further. The other investigator commented (4th September 1998): "I'm afraid 




Victim number: 49 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 38 Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: US$3,300 Time to hospital: 1 hour 8 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 





Leg Through knee 
Arm Above elbow 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The medic reported that at 09:13 hours a mine detonated and that the victim received medical 
care after seven minutes. His injuries were "amputation caused by the mine to the left leg and 
arm and deep wounds to the left side of the body. Traumatic shock (3rd degree) on arrival in 
hospital. 
The compensation award document (in Portuguese), signed on 16th July 1996, lists the 
injuries as: amputation of the right arm at the shoulder; amputation of the right leg above the 
knee, and deep lacerations to the left thigh. The victim was rated 100% physically disabled 
and had severe scarring on the left leg. This report concluded that the victim could no longer 
work as a deminer, and that he needed another person to assist him with his daily routine. He 
was awarded 60% + 40% x 30 x US$110 (salary) = US$3,300. 
The victim’s DOB was 27/05/57. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was in breach of SOPs and was not corrected. The investigators suggest that both training 
and equipment may have been inadequate, which may have been contributory senior 
management failings. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The researcher heard the rumour that the victim was intoxicated (from the investigator who 
later decided that he was not) while visiting the demining group in 1995. There was no 
conclusive evidence that he was, or was not. However, an independent investigation might 
have been more likely to uncover the truth than an internal inquiry. 
In case of confusion over the victim's activity at the time of the accident, he was supposed to 
be both using a detector and "Excavation" to ten centimetres. Both should have been done 
regardless of whether there were detector readings. While thorough, (and still in use by some 
3 
groups in 1999) this method seems to lead to deminers seeing little point in bothering to use 
the detector.  
It is likely that his trowel, or parts of it, caused his upper arm injuries (as indicated informally). 
The method of determining depth of the device by reference to the crater depth without 
measuring the soil hardness is unreliable. 
The “inadequate equipment (?)” noted refers to the issue of industrial safety spectacles as 
PPE. 
 
4 
